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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the appellants Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari should be denied because it does not satisfy the
requirements of Rule 46(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
2.

Whether the appellant's Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari should be denied because it does not satisfy the
requirements of Rule 46(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION
The Utah Court of Appeals' opinion in this case, Ashcroft v.
Industrial Commission, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah App. 1993), is attached
hereto as Addendum "A."

UTAH SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review a Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-22(3)(a) (1992), 78-2-2(5) (1992), and Rule 45 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The statutes which govern the Utah Supreme Court's
acceptance of and deliberation upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari are Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) (1992) and
78-2-2(5) (1992), as well as Rule 45 and Rule 46 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

These provisions (attached hereto

as Addendum "B") indicate that the Supreme Court's certiorari
jurisdiction can be utilized to review decisions of the Utah
Court of Appeals, but not decisions of Utah's administrative
tribunals, when the following circumstances are present:
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a
matter of right, but of judicial discretion,
and will be granted only for special and
important reasons. The following, while
neither controlling nor wholly measuring the
Supreme Court's discretion, indicate the
character of reasons that will be considered:
(a) When a panel of the Court of
Appeals has rendered a decision in
conflict with the decision of
another panel of the Court of
Appeals on the same issue of law;
(b) When a panel of the Court of
Appeals has decided a question of
2

state or federal law in a way that
is in conflict with the decision of
the Supreme Court;
(c) When a panel of the Court of
Appeals has rendered a decision
that has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings or has so far
sanctioned such a departure by a
lower court as to call for an
exercise of the Supreme Court's
power of supervision; or
(d) When the Court of Appeals has
decided an important question of
municipal, state or federal law
which has not been, but should be,
settled by the Supreme Court.
[Emphasis added.]
(See Rule 4 6 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure attached
hereto as Addendum "B.")
Contrary to the contentions raised on page 2 of the
appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Utah Code Ann. § 351-77 (1988) and Utah Industrial Commission Rule R568-1-9(A)
(which deal with the Industrial Commission's use of medical
panels) are not "controlling statutes" pertinent to the Utah
Supreme Court's review of the Certiorari Petition.

The Court of

Appeals properly refused to even address whether the aforesaid
statute and rule have any applicability to the appellant's
assignment of Industrial Commission error.

The Court's Ashcroft

decision, attached as Addendum "A," simply affirms the Industrial
Commission's ruling that the appellant failed to come forward
3

with competent medical evidence in support of his claim of an
impairment rating greater than 5%.

Accordingly, the appellant's

Certiorari Petition is nothing more than an attempt to
demonstrate that the Court of Appeals somehow committed serious
error in affirming the Industrial Commission's evidentiary
rulings.

Nowhere does the appellant's Certiorari Petition come

close to demonstrating such error.

Rather, the appellant focuses

on § 35-1-77 and R568-1-9, and thereby improperly asks the
Supreme Court to conduct a de novo review of the Industrial
Commission's Final Order rather than an analysis of the Court of
Appeals' opinion.

His Certiorari Petition, therefore, fails to

address the Rule 46 considerations deemed pertinent by the Utah
Supreme Court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and
Disposition Below.

The above-entitled action derives from an industrial
accident that occurred on September 25, 1989.

(R. I.)1

Following Mr. Ashcroft's industrial injury, he and the appellees
entered into a Compensation Agreement which included a

x

The designation "R. 1." refers to page 1 of the record on
appeal transmitted by the Industrial Commission to the Utah Court
of Appeals.
4

Stipulation indicating that Mr. Ashcroft had sustained a 5%
permanent impairment due to his industrial accident.

(See the

parties' Compensation Agreement attached hereto as Addendum "C.")
Following settlement of the claim, Mr. Ashcroft decided that
he would ask the Industrial Commission to increase his permanent
impairment rating and award him additional compensation and
medical expense benefits.

(R. 1.)

After the submission of

numerous medical records, and an Industrial Commission hearing
conducted by Administrative Law Judge Lisa-Michele Church, an
Order was entered denying the relief sought by Mr. Ashcroft.
(R. 39.)

(See the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Order attached hereto as Addendum MD.fl)
Mr. Ashcroft then filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial
Commission (R. 47.)

In his Motion, Mr. Ashcroft argued (without

reference to any evidence contrary to his position) that the
relief he had requested was generally supported by "objective
evidence."

He also argued that the administrative law judge had

committed prejudicial error in failing to submit the case to a
medical panel when the medical evidence contained a supposed
conflict between physicians' impairment ratings.

Following its

consideration of the record evidence, the Industrial Commission
correctly found that no medical evidence conflict existed, and
the Commission affirmed the administrative law judge's Order.
5

(R. 64.)

(See the Industrial Commission's final Order attached

hereto as Addendum "E.")
Mr. Ashcroft then appealed the Industrial Commission's final
Order (R. 69), and filed a Rule 10 Motion for Summary Disposition.
(R. 106.)

The Rule 10 Motion was denied.

Following oral argument

on the merits of the case, the Court of Appeals upheld the
Industrial Commission's refusal to use a medical panel on the
grounds that the appellant failed to come forward with competent
medical evidence which could have justified referral of the evidence
to a medical panel.

(See Addendum "A.")

The Court also concluded

that the Industrial Commission erred when it used the phrase
"substantial evidence" in reviewing the Administrative Law Judge's
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.

Accordingly, the

case was remanded to the Industrial Commission so that the
appropriate "preponderance of evidence" standard of review could be
applied.
B.

Statement of Background Facts.

As a preliminary matter, appellees should point out that the
"Statement of Facts" contained in the applicant's Certiorari Brief
are not the facts which were adopted by the Industrial Commission or
by the Court of Appeals.

In the Statement of Facts outlined below,

appellees present the pertinent facts as found by the Industrial
Commission and as relied upon by the Court of Appeals.
6

On September 25, 1989, Mr. Ashcroft sustained an industrial
injury while unloading freight from a truck.

(R. 1.)

Mr. Ashcroft promptly reported his injury and left work to seek
medical treatment.
In the emergency room, x-rays were taken, and Mr. Ashcroft was
given muscle relaxants and pain medication.
available from this visit.)

(No medical records are

Mr. Ashcroft then consulted with Dr.

McGregor, his family physician, on September 28, 1989.

(R. 130.)

Dr. McGregor continued to see Mr. Ashcroft for two months.
130.)

(R.

Dr. McGregor's records indicate a diagnosis of bulging

disc/spinal stenosis and refer the applicant to Dr. Bliss, a
neurosurgeon.

(R. 13 0.)

Dr. Bliss saw Mr. Ashcroft on October 20, 1989, and diagnosed
".

.

level."

.

central disc herniation with minor spinal stenosis at this
He recommended conservative treatment. (R. 146.)

In

December, 1989, Dr. Bliss noted Mr. Ashcroft's continuing bilateral
leg pain and reviewed his myelogram and CT scan.
Bliss diagnosed " . . .

(R. 150.)

Dr.

sciatica-like symptoms with central disc

herniation and no definite evidence of neural impingement."

Mr.

Ashcroft was then referred to Dr. Moress for a neurological consult.
(R. 150.)
Dr. Moress saw Mr. Ashcroft on February 1, 1990 and recommended
a complete myelography.

(R. 155.)
7

Dr. Bliss reviewed this

recommendation and noted " . . .
multilevel disc disease.

MRI scan of c. spine demonstrates

[Emphasis added.]

Previous lumbar

myelogram and CT scan demonstrated multiple level bulging discs
without definite stenosis.

[Emphasis added.]11

(R. 151.)

Later in

the same report, Dr. Bliss states, "patient clearly interprets all
of his problems as stemming from his recent accident although
multiple level disc disease indicates that he has had pre-existing
problems and in addition, back pain is not his major complaint at
this time.

[Emphasis added.]"

(R. 151.)

On February 2, 1990, in response to an inquiry from the State
Vocational Rehabilitation Office, Dr. Bliss described
Mr. Ashcroft's status as "medically stable for return to limited
employment in nonlaboring activity."

(R. 153.)

Further,

Mr. Ashcroft testified at his May 19, 1992 Industrial Commission
hearing that he had applied for unemployment benefits in late 1989.
(R. 41.)
On April 12, 1989, Mr. Ashcroft consulted another orthopedic
physician, Dr. Neal Capel.

Dr. Capel recommended a program of

conditioning for Mr. Ashcroft.

(R. 158.)

On May 10, 1990, Dr. Capel described a visit
Mr. Ashcroft had made to the emergency room for intrascapular pain
and noted, " . . .

[t]he most likely explanation is an anxiety

reaction with somatization."

(R. 159.)
8

Dr. Capel continued to

recommend swimming, bicycle riding and general conditioning, noting
that Mr. Ashcroft was to begin an architectural drafting course at
Dixie College on May 22, 1990.
Dr. Capel's

(R. 159.)

June 5, 1990 office note states, " . . . [t]he

patient has no change in his status and was given a work release.
He has a job as a cook that is eminent [sic] and was given a release
from the welfare department.11

(R. 160.)

Mr. Ashcroft testified at

the hearing that he did apply for the cook position, but following
this work release he chose not to return to work and began attending
school at Dixie College.

(R. 41.)

On July 12, 1990, Dr. Capel stated that the sitting required by
Mr. Ashcroft's school activities was making him uncomfortable.
also had some aching muscles.

(R. 161.)

He

Later in the summer, Dr.

Capel prescribed Xanax for Mr. Ashcroft's anxiety symptoms.

(R.

162.)
Mr. Ashcroft began working for his father in his father's
grocery store in Arizona in September, 1990.
lasted a few weeks.

(R. 163.)

This job

Dr. Capel's September 20, 1990 office note

states, " . . . [h]e has found that the back did fairly well but his
legs got tired as he was on his feet all day on concrete."
163.)

(R.

Dr. Capel continued to prescribe Xanax and Naprosyn. (Id.)

Dr. Capel's notes for a November 13, 1990 visit indicate that
Mr. Ashcroft was having back and leg pain, and had discontinued some
9

of his conditioning activities.

(R. 164.)

Dr. Capel's

November

29, 1990 office notes describe a "new episode" of back pain
occurring when Mr. Ashcroft lifted firewood and had a ". . . sudden
onset of low back pain..."

(R. 165.)

On the basis of this new

episode, Dr. Capel diagnosed facet syndrome and low back strain.
(Id.)
At his January 29, 1991 office visit, Mr. Ashcroft reported to
Dr. Capel that he had worked in his father's grocery store again
during Christmas and experienced leg aches.

(R. 166.)

He requested

a prescription of Ascendin, but Dr. Capel declined to prescribe it
due to side effects.
At Mr. Ashcroft's visit with Dr. Capel on March 15, 1991, Dr.
Capel reported another new episode of back pain:

"The patient has

been getting along reasonably well until March 14, 1991, when he
bent down to clean up manure from his dog.

He developed a sudden

pain in the low back and had difficulty standing up straight."
167.)

(R.

Dr. Capel concluded that the applicant had had a recurrence

of iliolumbar strain sprain and, " . . . I further advised him that
as far as the Industrial Commission is concerned, he is an
administrative catch 22 situation where he cannot force them to
assume care of his present complaint and while it is possibly
associated in quality relation, it is a new episode."

10

(R. 167.)

Following Dr. Capel's treatment, the applicant was examined by
Dr. D. R. McNaught on May 8, 1991.

(R. 174.)

Dr. McNaught

concluded that Mr. Ashcroft did have severe sciatica, due to the
bulging of lumbar discs L4,5 and possibly LS.

He recommended that

the applicant investigate surgery, although Dr. McNaught expressed
some reservations about that approach.

(R. 189.)

Mr. Ashcroft was not able to pursue surgical intervention on
his back, due at least partially to the fact that he has Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome.

The medical records indicate that Mr.

Ashcroft tested positive for the HIV virus in the 1980s, and this
condition has since developed into AIDS.
applicant for AIDS since 1989.

Dr. Hagen has treated the

(R. 120.)

He stated in a letter

dated May 14, 1992, that the applicant's AIDS condition does not
prevent him from conducting his normal activities; Dr. Hagan's
records also indicate that he treated Mr. Ashcroft for a variety of
conditions, and that Mr. Ashcroft was taking Prozac for depression.
(R. 137.)
Dr. McNaught referred the applicant to Dr. John Sanders for
consideration of his back condition.

(R. 190.)

Dr. Sanders

produced several reports, including one dated August 9, 1991 which
concluded that surgical intervention was not warranted at that time,
with no reference to the AIDS factors.

(R. 190.)

Dr.

Sanders also

wrote a one paragraph report dated October 7, 1991 stating:
11

". •

.It is my opinion that because he is unable to return to his usual
work that he should have been given a disability rating of fifteen
percent on that basis alone."

(R. 193.)

(See Addendum "F.")

Dr. Boyd Holbrook performed a file review on the applicant's
case on April 10, 1992, and found that the majority of his problems
were not industrial in nature.
M

G.ff)

(See Report attached as Addendum

Dr. Holbrook stated in part, " . . . [t]his man does have

significant multi-level cervical disc disease that is not related to
his industrial injury and is not being considered for any possible
surgical treatment and appears to be a relatively minor portion of
his symptom complex."

(Id.)

Dr. Holbrook stated that no further

medical treatment was needed in connection with Mr. Ashcroft's 1989
injury, because ". . .it does not appear that more medical
examinations or more diagnostic studies will assist in the
delineation or management of his problem," and that Chymopapain
injections are not advisable.

(See Addendum "G.")

Subsequently, on April 23, 1992, Dr. McNaught dictated an
office progress note which indicates that "I would have suggested a
10% disability . . . ."

(R. 177.)

This "disability rating" (which

Mr. Ashcroft now relies upon as a medically sound impairment rating)
cites no medical records nor the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of
Permanent Impairment for support.

(See Dr. McNaught's office note

attached hereto as Addendum "H.")
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which Rule 4 6 generally imposes as a prerequisite to the Utah
Supreme Court's exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction do not exist
in this case.
POINT I
APPELLANT'S CERTIORARI PETITION DOES NOT
SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 46(d)
OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
In Point I of the Certiorari Brief, the applicant argues that
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77 (1988) and Utah Industrial Commission Rule
R568-1-9(A) required both the Industrial Commission and the Utah
Court of Appeals to enter orders directing that a medical panel be
convened to review the evidence submitted at the appellant's
Industrial Commission hearing.

Because the Industrial Commission

refused to convene such a panel, and because the Utah Court of
Appeals affirmed the Industrial Commission's Order, the appellant
argues that the Utah Supreme Court must now exercise its certiorari
jurisdiction so that it can instruct the lower courts in the proper
use of medical panels.

Unfortunately, the appellant has completely

misread the Orders entered by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ),
the Industrial Commission, and the Utah Court of Appeals.

The three

rulings quite clearly indicate that § 35-1-77 and R568-1-9 have no
relevance to the facts of this case because those provisions only
come into play after the appellant has presented the Industrial
Commission with competent medical evidence that can, as a threshold
14
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Co,, 424 P.2d 440, 442 (Utah 1967).

Consistent with Price River

and Jensen, the Court of Appeals7 Ashcroft opinion merely defers to
the Industrial Commission in its assessment as to whether the
medical evidence in this case was sufficient to give rise to the
need for medical panel assistance.2

There is no factual or legal

basis, therefore, for the appellant's Certiorari Petition under Rule
46(d).
Appellant's sole argument during the Industrial Commission
proceedings below was that a medical panel needed to be convened in
this case due to an alleged 5% difference in permanent impairment
ratings assigned to the appellant by different physicians.3

A brief

review of the evidence analyzed by the Industrial Commission amply
demonstrates that the appellant has never had a meritorious argument
supporting his request for medical panel referral.

Indeed, the

administrative law judge properly observed that the so-called

2

It should be observed that the Ashcroft opinion is narrowly
limited to the facts of the present case and will not generally
extend to those cases where an injured worker or his attorney has
provided the Industrial Commission with competent medical evidence.
3

Appellant's arguments that a panel had to be convened due to
the Industrial Commission's use of "summary medical forms" and due
to conflicting medical expense and medical stabilization evidence
are arguments that were never raised at any stage of the Industrial
Commission proceedings! Clearly, such hindsight arguments (which
the appellant obviously wishes he could have made to the Court of
Appeals) cannot now be considered for the first time in a Rule 46
certiorari context. See, Pease v. Industrial Commission, 694 P. 2d
613 (Utah 1984).
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his usual work" (and is therefore a disability rating); Dr. Sanders'
opinion is not a physical impairment rating based upon the AMA
Guidelines.
Given the insufficiency of Dr. Sanders' and Dr. McNaught's
"ratings", the administrative law judge/ the Industrial Commission,
and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Mr. Ashcroft wholly
failed to shoulder his burden of proof (imposed by a long line of
Utah cases including Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15
(Utah 1986)); Mr. Ashcroft simply failed to submit to the Industrial
Commission any records containing a well supported impairment
rating.

(See page 7 of Addendum "D.")

Because of the deference the

Court of Appeals affords to Industrial Commission findings of fact,
and based on the "reasonableness" standard of review governing the
Court's subject evidentiary issue (under Morton International v.
Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991)), the Industrial
Commission's final Order was properly affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Finally, given all of the new arguments the applicant has
raised for the first time at the certiorari stage, the appellant is
really asking the Supreme Court to grant him a de novo review of the
Industrial Commission's final Order.

However, as this Court

recently stated in Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101, fn. 2
(1992) :
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We take tnis opportunity to remind the Bar that
when exercis ing our certiorarI j urisdicti on
granted by section 78-2-2 (3) (a), we review a
decision of the Court of Appeals, not of the
trial court. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-22 ( 3 ) ( a ) . Therefore, the briefs of the parties
should address the decision of the Court of
Appeals, not the decision of the trial court.
To re-state the matter: We do not grant
certiorari to review de novo the trial court's
decision. See Utah R.App.P. 46.
[Emphasis
added.]
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to preserve issues for appellate consideration.

More specifically,

the appellant contends that he properly preserved an insufficiency
of the evidence issue below and that the Court of Appeals' opinion
should be reversed due to the Court's conclusion that:
. . • we deem that Ashcroft has waived the
issues of sufficiency of the evidence and
adequacy of the ALJ's findings and that he
cannot now raise them for the first time on
petition for judicial review.
(See Addendum "A" at pp. 268-69.)

The appellant's Rule 46(c)

argument lacks merit and should be denied for three reasons.
First, the appellant's argument should be seen for what it is.
All that the appellant is asking the Supreme Court to do is reexamine the Motion for Review he filed with the Industrial
Commission on the grounds that the judges sitting on the Court of
Appeals bench are apparently incompetent when it comes to evaluating
lower court pleadings and determining whether certain legal issues
have been raised in those pleadings.
fail.

Appellant's argument must

The Court of Appeals is amply competent to examine an

Industrial Commission Motion for Review and determine whether a
legal argument (such as a sufficiency of the evidence argument) is
contained in the pleading.

The Court of Appeals conducted this

examination, and then very clearly stated that the appellant's
Motion for Review does not contain a sufficiency of the evidence
challenge.

Surely such an elementary and simple conclusion, based
20
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ui ie; be

stricken partly on the basis of a failure to marshall the evidence);
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah
App. 1991) (holding that the marshalling process involved the
arduous and painstaking listing of all evidence adverse to the
position of the party challenging the lower court's Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law).

Without undertaking the marshalling

process, the appellant never began to challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence underpinning the Administrative Law Judge's final
Order.

Again, a Writ of Certiorari should not be granted under Rule

46(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Third, the appellant mistakenly refers to Rule 49(a)(4) of the
Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure in arguing that this Court should
grant his requested Writ.

Rule 49(a)(4) —

which provides that a

statement of a certiorari issue will be deemed to comprise every
subsidiary question fairly included therein" —
context of a certiorari proceeding.

applies only in a

The Rule cannot be used to

somehow suggest that the appellants' Motion for Review filed with
the Industrial Commission must be read in such an overly broad
fashion that it can be deemed to contain a sufficiency of the
evidence challenge.

In short, the appellant simply has no factual

or legal basis for arguing that he legitimately raised a sufficiency
of the evidence challenge.

The Court of Appeals properly concluded,
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therefore, that the appellant waived the is-ue
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much as we vacate the trial court's determination and remand for further findings
as to the equitable distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the hardware store,
the propriety of awarding accounting costs
to Mrs. Rappleye, and the reasonableness
of the award of attorney fees to Mrs. Rappleye at trial, Mrs. Rappleye has substantially prevailed on those issues. Potter v.
Potter, 845 P.2d 272, 275, (Utah App.1993).
Accordingly, we remand the issue of attorney fees incurred by Mrs. Rappleye on
appeal to the trial court for its consideration of such fees in light of the disposition
of this case on appeal. Id.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's award of alimony to Mrs. Rappleye. We vacate (1) the
court's valuation of the Merrill Lynch account, (2) the award of all of the proceeds
from the sale of the hardware store to Mr.
Rappleye, (3) the denial of accounting costs
to Mrs. Rappleye, and (4) the award of
attorney fees to Mrs. Rappleye, and remand those matters to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We also determine that Mrs.
Rappleye is entitled to attorney fees on
appeal and remand the matter to the trial
court for its consideration of such fees in
light of the disposition of this case on appeal.
BILLINGS and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
{ O |KEYNUMMR SYSTEM^

Denis ASHCROFT, Petitioner,
•.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH;
Airfax Express, Inc.; and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Respondents.
No. 920586-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 16, 1993.
Workers' compensation benefits were
denied by the Industrial Commission, and

claimant sought review, The Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held that: (1) certain issues
were not properly preserved; (2) there was
no error in failing to convene a medical
panel; but (3) Commission applied incorrect
standard of review.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.

1. Workers' Compensation <s=>1855, 1856
Workers' compensation claimant did
not properly preserve for review issues of
sufficiency of evidence and adequacy of
findings of administrative law judge where
he failed to raise those issues before the
Industrial Commission, but claim that Commission employed the wrong standard of
proof was properly before Court of Appeals even though raised for first time on
judicial review, since it could not have been
raised until after the Commission made its
review.
2. Workers' Compensation <s=1820
Preponderance of the evidence rather
than substantial evidence was the correct
standard of proof for review by Industrial
Commission in determining workers' compensation claim.
3. Workers' Compensation <s=»1687
Statutory language concerning convening of medical panel in workers' compensation case is permissive rather than mandatory." U.C.A.1953, 35-l-77(lXa).
4. Administrative Law and Procedure
<s»413
Agency's interpretation or application
of its own rule will not be disturbed unless
determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality.
5. Workers' Compensation «=>1687
Industrial Commission rule requiring
utilization of medical review panel in certain workers' compensation cases did not
apply where Commission found no specific
or supported impairment rating in the rec-
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ord, much less conflicting impairment ratings, and did not find that ratings given
related to industrial cause. U.C.A.1953,
35-l-77(lXa), 6&-46b-16(4)(hXii).
Bruce J. Wilson and Sam Primavera, Provo, for petitioner.
Michael E. Dyer and Michael A. Peterson, Salt Lake City, for Airfax Exp., Inc.,
and Liberty Mut Ins. Co.
Benjamin A. Sims, Salt Lake City, for
Indus. Com'n.
Before GARFF, GREENWOOD and
ORME, JJ.
OPINION
GARFF, Judge: -Petitioner, Denis Ashcroft, seeks review
by this court of an Industrial Commission
order denying him workers compensation
benefits. We affirm in part, reverse in
part, and remand.
FACTS
' 'On September 25, 1989, Ashcroft sustained an industrial injury while unloading
freight from a truck. The employer's compensation insurer paid temporary total disability benefits from September 26, 1989
through June 5, 1990 as well as compensation for a five percent permanent partial
impairment
On September 26, 1991, Ashcroft petitioned for additional temporary disability
compensation, an increased permanent partial disability rating and medical expenses.
Ashcroft alleged that the same September
25, 1989 industrial injury rendered him unable to work. After a formal hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) denied Ashcroff s
claim. The ALJ did not convene a medical
panel, despite a request by both parties'
counsel to do so. The ALJ discounted conelusory statements of two expert witnesses
regarding Ashcroft's impairment ratings:
Dr. Capel merely recites what the insurance adjustor was offering and postpones a rating; Dr. Sanders makes a

conclusory statement of 15% without reference to any underlying facts or industrial cause.
The ALJ made findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the Commission essentially adopted. She determined that
"the true cause of [Ashcroft's] continuing
problems stem from pre-existing degenerative problems, intervening non-industrial
events, and unrelated health conditions.
Therefore, his claim fails for lack of medical and legal causation/'
Ashcroft moved the Industrial Commission for review. In his motion, Ashcroft
failed to raise issues regarding sufficiency
of the evidence and adequacy of the ALJ's
findings, concentrating his administrative
appeal on the ALJ's refusal to convene a
medical panel The Commission, after
adopting the AU's findings, affirmed the
ALJ's denial of benefits. Ashcroft now
seeks review of the Commission's denial.
'

PRESERVATION OF ISSUES
[1] We first consider the threshold issue of whether Ashcroft properly preserved for review the issues he now raises,
namely issues of sufficiency of the evidence, standard of proof and adequacy of
the AU's findings, given that he failed to
raise these issues before the Commission.
Pease v. Industrial Comm'n, 694 P.2d
613 (Utah 1984) is dispositive. The Pease
court held that a petitioner, in moving for
review, has "the obligation to raise all the
issues that could have been presented at
that time, and those issues not raised [are]
waived." Id. at 616; accord Smallwood v.
Industrial Comm'n, 841 P.2d 716, 718 n. 1
(Utah App.1992). The rationale is that by
raising an issue at the administrative level,
"either the administrative law judge or the
Commission could have adjudicated the issue." Pease, 694 P.2d at 616.
Ashcroft failed to raise the above issues
before the Commission. Of those issues,
all except for his claim that the Commission employed the wrong standard of
proof, are claims that could have been presented to the Commission. See id. Thus,
we deem that Ashcroft has waived the is-
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sues of sufficiency of the evidence and
adequacy of the ALJ's findings and that he
cannot now raise them for the first time on
petition for judicial review. Id. Ashcroft
could not have raised the claim that the
Commission employed the wrong standard
of proof until after the Commission had
made its review. Thus, this claim is properly before this court even though it is
raised for the first time on judicial review.
STANDARD OF PROOF
[2] Ashcroft claims the Commission applied the wrong standard of proof when it
denied his motion for review. In its review
of the ALJ's decision, the Commission employed the phrase "substantial evidence."
This is not the correct standard. The quantum of evidence required to prove compensability is a preponderance of the evidence.
Lipman v. Industrial Comm'n, 592 P.2d
616, 618 (Utah 1979).
The distinction between preponderance
of evidence and substantial evidence is significant A reviewing body, such as this
court, applies the standard of substantial
evidence to examine whether the record
contains evidence supporting the findings
made by the trier of fact The reviewing
court does not weigh the evidence, in contrast a trier of fact including the Commission, determines whether the petitioner has
met his or her burden of proof, the standard being preponderance of the evidence.
The Commission's mistake as to the standard of proof is not one of mere phraseology. Both Ashcroft and this court are entitled to know that his proof was evaluated
under the correct standard.
We therefore remand the claim for the
Commission to evaluate it under the standard of preponderance of the evidence.
MEDICAL PANEL
Ashcroft claims the Commission acted
unreasonably and irrationally in not convening a medical panel. Ashcroft preserved this issue by including it in his motion for review before the Commission.
See Pease v. Industrial Comm'n, 694 P.2d
613, 616 (Utah 1984).

[3] The "Commission may refer the
medical aspects of [a workers compensation] case to a medical panel appomted by
the Commission." Utah Code Ann. § 35-177(lXa) (1992) (emphasis added). This statutory language is permissive, not mandatory. See Intermountain Health Care, Inc.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 839 P.2d 841, 845
(Utah App.1992).
Pursuant to section 35-l-77(lXa), the
Commission enacted Rule 568-1-9 as a
guideline in determining if a medical panel
should be convened. In contrast to the
statute, the wording of the agency rule is
mandatory:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge where:
1. One or more significant medical issues may be involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be shown by
conflicting medical reports/ Significant
medical issues are involved when there
are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which vary
more than 5% of the whole person,
Utah Code Admin.P. R568-1-9 (emphasis
added). Thus, the rule requires the Commission to convene a medical panel when
the evidence supports conflicting industrial
impairment ratings with more than a five
percent difference. If the evidence regarding impairment ratings supports ratings
that vary by more than five percent as
petitioner asserts, a medical panel would be
necessary to resolve the differences.
In short the statute explicitly grants discretion to the Commission as to whether to
convene a medical panel. The Commission,
in turn, restricted its own discretion by
promulgating the Rule requiring it to convene a medical panel in certain instances.
[4,51 Our review is pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii) (1987) because this issue requires us to consider
whether the agency acted contrary to its
own rule. Thus, "we will not disturb the
agency's interpretation or application of
the [rule] unless its determination exceeds
the bounds of reasonableness and rationali-
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ty." King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850
P.2d 1281, 1286 (Utah App.1993).1 .
Here, the Commission determined:
The bald statement by Dr. Sanders, in
connection with his assertion that a 15
percent rating was appropriate, was supported by absolutely no medical analysis
or logic. We need some justification, and
in the absence of such, we cannot speculate. In the case of Dr. Capel, there is
no statement by him as to any appropriate rating, other than a statement that
the adjuster had decided upon a five percent rating. We therefore conclude that
the evidence does not support the applicant in this regard.
In short, the Commission found no specific
or supported impairment rating in the record, much less conflicting impairment ratings. Nor did the Commission find that the
ratings given related to an industrial cause.
Thus, there was no departure from the
agency rule because the agency rule did
not apply. Therefore, we need not consider
whether any departure was reasonable and
rational.
CONCLUSION
Ashcroft could have, but failed to raise
the issues of sufficiency of the evidence
and adequacy of the AU's findings. We
therefore deem that he has waived those
issues. We affirm the AU's refusal to
convene a medical panel as reasonable and
rational because the A U found no specific
or supported impairment rating in the record. On the other hand, we cannot affirm
the Commission's decision because the
Commission employed the wrong standard
of proof in its review of the evidence. We
therefore reverse the Commission's order
and remand for the Commission to conduct
a review employing the proper standard of
preponderance of the evidence.
1. In the event we determine an agency has in
fact departed from its own rule, we would then
consider whether the departure was reasonable
and rational. King, 850 P.2d at 1284-88; Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4XhXii); SEMECO Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d
1167, 1174 (Utah 1993) (Durham J., dissenting)

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.
-..
GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ., concur.
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Moen; David L. Forsgren; Richard M.
Forsgren; Michael D. Forsgren; and
Chris V. Forsgren, Defendants, Appellants, and Cross-Appellees.
No. 920640-CA.
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 18, 1993.
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Action was brought for establishment
of prescriptive easement The First District Court, Box Elder County, Robert L.
Newey, J., entered orders establishing
prescriptive easement, clarifying size and
burden of easement, and holding owner of
dominant estate in contempt Appeal and
cross appeal were' taken. The Court of
Appeals, Jackson, J., held that (1) relief
from original judgment was properly
granted based upon determination that
judgment was not factually consistent with
legal ruling regarding historical width of
easement; (2) requirement that gates providing access to easement be kept closed
was inconsistent with historic use of easement and thus was improper; and (3) owner of dominant estate was properly held in
contempt for dumping onions along ease("courts also should uphold reasonable and rational departures from agency rules absent a
showing by the party challenging the departure
that the departure violated some other right")
(citing Union Pac. HH v. Auditing Div., 842 P.2d
876, 879 (Utah 1992)).

ADDENDUM

"B

78-2-1.5

JUDICIAL CODE

History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-2-1; L. 1969, ch. 247, § 1; 1986, ch.
47, § 40; 1988, ch. 248, § 4; 1990, ch. 80, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection
(2), rewrote the second sentence which read
'Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of the
Supreme Court is ten years and until his successor is appointed and approved in accordance
with Section 20-1-7.1" and, in Subsection (6),
substituted "determines" for "decides" at the
end of the fourth sentence.
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23,
1990, deleted "next" after "January" and made
punctuation changes in Subsection (2); deleted
"not" following "chief justice may" in the third
sentence of Subsection (3); deleted "additional"
before "duties" in Subsection (5); deleted

"where not inconsistent with the law" following "chief justice" and added "as consistent
with the law" at the end of Subsection (6).
Cross-References. — Chief justice, Utah
Const, Art. VIII, Sec. 2.
Disqualification in particular case, Utah
Const., Art. Vm, Sec. 2.
Judicial
nomination
and
selection,
§ 20-1-7.1 et seq.
Membership on state law library board,
§ 37-1-1.
Proceedings
unaffected
by
vacancy,
§ 78-7-21.
Qualifications of justices, Utah Const., Art.
VIII, Sec. 7.
Retirement, Utah Const., Art. Vm, Sec. 15;
§ 49-6-101 et seq., §§ 78-7-29, 78-7-30.
Salary, Utah Const., Art. Vm, Sec. 14.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts
§§ 67, 68.
C.J.S. — 21 C J.S. Courts § 111 et seq.; 48A
C.J.S. Judges §§ 3, 7, 8, 21 to 25, 85.

Key Numbers. — Courts «=» 101, 248;
Judges *=» 1, 7 to 12.

78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 78-2-1.5 (L. 1969, ch.
225, § 2), relating to salaries of Supreme Court
justices, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch. 182,
§ 4.

Section 78-2-1.6 (L. 1979, ch. 134, § 1; 1981,
ch. 156, § 1), relating to salaries of justices,
was repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 267, § 2, effective July 1, 1982.

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
(v) the state engineer;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e);
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(g) afinaljudgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) general water adjudication;
(f) taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (f).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 41; 1987, ch. 161, § 303; 1988,
ch. 248, § 5; 1989, ch. 67, § 1.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
ch. 47, § 41 repeals former § 78-2-2, as enacted
by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 1, relating to original
appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court, and
enacts the above section.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25,1988, substituted "formal adjudicative proceedings" for "cases" in
Subsection (3)(e); added Subsection (3)(f); redesignated former Subsections (3)(f) to (3)(i) accordingly; substituted "(i)" for "(h)" at the end
of Subsection (4Xg); and made minor stylistic
changes.
The 1989 amendment, effective April 24,
1989, added "and Forestry" at the end of Subsection (3)(e)(iii); rewrote Subsection (4)(a)
which read "first degree and capital felony con-

victions"; substituted "(f)" for "(i)" at the end of
Subsection (4)(g); and made minor stylistic
changes.
Cross-References. — Appeals from juvenile courts, § 78-3a-51.
Appeals in criminal cases, U.R.Cr.P. 26.
Chief justice to preside over impeachment of
governor, § 77-5-2.
Election contest appeals, §§ 20-3-35,
20-15-14.
Extraordinary writs, Utah Const. Art. Vm,
Sec. 3; U.R.C.P. 65B.
Industrial commission orders, review of,
§ 35-1-36.
Jurisdiction, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 3.
State bar, promulgation of rules, review of
disciplinary orders, §§ 78-51-14, 78-51-19.
Unemployment compensation decisions, review of, § 35-4-10.
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TITLE VII.
JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO COURT OF APPEALS.
Rule 45- Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of
Court of Appeals.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah.

Rule 46. Considerations governing review of certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law;
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the
Supreme Court;
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; or
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled
by the Supreme Court.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1, 1992, changed the

subdivision designations from numbers to letters.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97
(Utah 1992).

Rule 47. Certification and transmission of record; joint
and separate petitions; cross-petitions; parties.
(a) Joint and separate petitions; cross-petitions. Parties interested
jointly, severally, or otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of
certiorari; any one or more of them may petition separately; or any two or
more of them may join in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be
reviewed on certiorari and involve identical or closely related questions, it
will suffice to file a single petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the
cases. A cross-petition for writ of certiorari shall not be joined with any other
filing.
(b) Parties. All parties to the proceeding in the Court of Appeals shall be
deemed parties in the Supreme Court, unless the petitioner notifies the Clerk
of the Supreme Court in writing of the petitioner's belief that one or more of
the parties below have no interest in the outcome of the petition. A copy of
such notice shall be served on all parties to the proceeding below, and a party
noted as no longer interested may remain a party by notifying the clerk, with
service on the other parties, that the party has an interest in the petition.
(c) Motion for certification and transmission of record. A party intending to file a petition for certiorari, prior to filing the petition or at any time
prior to action by the Supreme Court on the petition, may file a motion for an
order to have the Clerk of the Court of Appeals or the clerk of the trial court
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leant's Name:
et Address: . 330 SOOTH MAIN ST.
, State, Zip: ST. GEORGE, UTAH
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Social Security Wo.:
585-?o-6349
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leant Is entitled to Temporary Total OlsablHty (TTD) from the employer/carrier
iod FROM:
9/26/89
TO: 6/5/90
at the rate of 1210.00
per
il of 1 7710.00
of which S 7710.00
has been paid.
ical expenses totaling S 4728.31
any) due S
-n_
.

have been paid by the employer/ca

Balance

juant to the attached medical report and the applicable law the applicant Is eligible for
nanent partial disability compensation (PPO) at the rate of S?rn.nn
' • per week,
oencing 6/6/90
for 15.6 weeks, totaling S 3276.nn
. - / o r a s X Impairment
the
WHOLEMAK
due to his/her Industrial Injuries, {yf which S isnn.nn
been advanced).
11 cant Is also e l i g i b l e for compensation from the Employe/4 Reinsurance Fund for his/her
at the rate of $ _
for
weeks, totaling $
._, for
%
Jlrment of the _
__ due to his/her pp4-ex1sting condition..: 7 •;•,,
suant to U.C.A. 35-1-69. the Employers Reinsurance/fund w i l l reimburse employer/carrier.
_% of a l l temporary total disability corapensati op/and medical expenses paid on this claim.
consideration of the above payments, as provided by law, the claimant hereby accepts the
pensatlon and medical paid to date and/agrees with the permanent partial disability
1ng shown above. However, the Industrial Commission^ of Utah shall retain continuing
1sd1ct1on to modify awards as provides by Taw. Medical expenses incurred as a result of
Industrial injury are the continuing obligation of the \empl oyer or carrier.
Is understood that this agre« rot becomes binding and effective only when I t 1s approved
the Industrial Commission of bah. .
il leant's Slgnatu

7- ?-?Q
DATE

DAVID X. CEHRIS
ease type or print)

iloyers Reinsurance Fund
ilnlstrator's Signature
ewed and/is approved by the Industrial
above Compensation Agreement has been
jfefi**
should be deducted from the amounts
mission of Utah; Attorney's fees
ing and paid by the carrier/employer to attorney
(Please type_£r print)
te:
TE:

Industrial gatiaission of Utah

~

Compensation is tax exempt for Federal and State Income/Tax purposes.
Permanent partial disability compensation can be requested to be paid in one lump
sum. Lump Sum applications may be obtained from the Industrial Commission - 530-6800.,
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OP UTAH
Case No. 91000984

*

DENIS ASHCROFT,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
Applicant,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
vs.
AND ORDER

AIRFAX EXPRESS,
and/or
LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE,
Defendants.

*
*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Commission Conference Room, Washington County
Commission offices, 197 East Tabernacle, St.
George, Utah on May 19, 1992, at 9:00 o'clock a.m.
Said hearing pursuant to Order and Notice of the
Commission.

BEFORE:

The Honorable Lisa-Michele Church, Administrative
Law Judge.

APPEARANCES!

The applicant was present and represented by Bruce
Wilson, Attorney at Law.
The defendants were represented by Michael Dyer,
Attorney at Law.

This is a claim for additional temporary total disability
compensation and medical expenses in connection with a 9/25/89
industrial injury.
The defendant insurance carrier denies
liability on the basis of medical and legal causation.
An evidentiary hearing was held, during which oral and written
evidence was presented. At the conclusion of the evidentiary
hearing, the matter was taken under advisement by the
Administrative Law Judge.
Having been fully advised in the
premises, the Administrative Law Judge now enters the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
The applicant in this matter, Denis Ashcroft, was employed as
a driver for Airfax Express in 1989, earning 18 cents per mile. He
was unmarried with no dependent children at the time of his injury.
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On September 25, 1989, the applicant was unloading boxes with a
dolly to persons on the ground at a Salt Lake K-Mart location, and
he bent over and could not straighten up. He felt pain in his
back, crawled to the edge of the truck bed and called his employer.
His employer told him to finish unloading, but Ashcroft had the
store employees do it for him. He then drove to another K-Mart and
did the same. Ashcroft drove to Ogden, parked the truck, and took
a taxi to the McKay Dee Hospital Emergency Room.
At the emergency room, they took x-rays, gave him muscle
relaxants and pain medication. No medical records were available
from this visit. Thereafter the applicant rode the bus back to St.
George. There, he consulted Dr. McGregor, his family doctor, on
September 28, 1989 (Ex. D-01, p. 5). Dr. McGregor advised complete
bed rest and continued to see him for two months. Dr. McGregor's
records indicate a diagnosis of bulging disc/spinal stenosis and
refer the applicant to Dr. Bliss, a neurosurgeon.
Dr. Bliss saw the applicant on October 20, 1989, and
diagnosed, ". . . central disc herniation with minor spinal
stenosis at this level.11 He recommended conservative treatment.
(Ex. D-l, p. 19.)
In December, 1989, Dr. Bliss noted Ashcroft's continuing
bilateral leg pain and reviewed his myelogram and CT scan. He
stated his impression was "• . • sciatica-like symptoms with
central disc herniation and no definite evidence of neural
impingement." The applicant was then referred to Dr. Moress for a
neurological consult.
Dr. Moress saw Ashcroft on February 1, 1990 and recommended a
complete myelography. Dr. Bliss reviewed this recommendation and
noted w . . . [Dr. Moress] suspects possible demyelinating disorder
if symptoms are not explained by stenosis. MRI scan of c. spine
demonstrates multilevel disc disease. Previous lumbar myelogram
and CT scan demonstrated multiple level bulging discs without
definite stenosis.H Later in the same report, Dr. Bliss stated, H .
. . Patient clearly interprets all of his problems as stemming from
his recent accident although multiple level disc disease indicates
that he has had pre-existing problems and in addition, back pain is
not his major complaint at this time.11 (Ex. D-l, p. 24.)
On February 2, 1990, in response to an inquiry from State
Vocational Rehabilitation, Dr. Bliss described Ashcroft's status as
M
. . . medically stable for return to limited employment in nonlaboring activity." (Ex. D-l, p. 26.) The applicant testified
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that he applied for and was denied unemployment benefits in late
1989, due to a prior lien.
On April 12, 1990, the applicant consulted another orthopedic
physician, Dr. Neal Capel.
Dr. Capel saw him on 4/12/90 and
recommended a program of conditioning for Ashcroft. In the notes
of that visit, Dr. Capel also mentioned, ". . . Liberty Mutual
account manager determined his permanent partial disability as 5%,
March 26, 1990, is the cutoff of benefits...The patient will have
his disability rating deferred until the conclusion of his work
hardening and conditioning in 6 weeks." (Ex. D-l, p. 32.)
At the May 10, 1990, visit with the applicant, Dr. Capel
described a visit Ashcroft had made to the emergency room for
intrascapular pain and noted, " . . . The most likely explanation is
an anxiety reaction with somatization." Dr. Capel continued to
recommend swimming, bicycle riding and general conditioning.
At the June 5, 1990, visit, Dr. Capel's office notes state, ".
. . The patient has no change in his status and was given a work
release. He has a job as a cook that is eminent [sic] and was
given a release from the welfare department." (Ex. D-l, p. 34.)
Ashcroft testified he did apply for the cook position. Following
this work release however, the applicant did not return to work,
but began attending school at Dixie College.
At the July 12, 1990, office visit, Dr. Capel stated that
sitting required by the applicants school activities was making
him uncomfortable. He also had some aching muscles. Later in the
summer, Dr. Capel prescribed Xanax for Ashcroft's anxiety symptoms.
Ashcroft began working for his father in his grocery store in
Arizona in September, 1990. This job lasted a few weeks. Dr.
Capel/s notes state, ". . . H e has found that the back did fairly
well but his legs got tired as he was on his feet all day on
concrete." Dr. Capel continued to prescribe Xanax and Naprosyn.
(Ex. D-l, p. 37.)
Dr. Capel's notes for November 13, 1990, visit indicate that
Ashcroft was having back and leg pain, and had discontinued some of
his conditioning activities. His November 29, 1990, office notes
describe a "new episode" of back pain occurring when Ashcroft
lifted firewood and had, ". . . sudden onset of low back pain..."
(Ex. D-l, p. 39.) Dr. Capel diagnosed facet syndrome and low back
strain. The applicant testified that this episode involved him
lifting two or three pieces of wood branches that would fit in his
fireplace.
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At his January 29, 1991, office visit, the applicant reported
to Dr. Capel that he had worked in his father's grocery store again
during Christinas and experienced leg aches.
He requested a
prescription of Ascendin, but Dr. Capel declined to prescribe it
due to side effects.
At Ashcroft's visit with Dr. Capel on March 15, 1991, Dr.
Capel reported another episode of back pain: MThe patient has been
getting along reasonably well until March 14, 1991, when he bent
down to clean up manure from his dog. He developed a sudden pain
in the low back and had difficulty standing up straight.11 Dr.
Capel concluded that the applicant had had a recurrence of
iliolumbar strain sprain and, ". . . 1 further advised him that as
far as the Industrial Commission is concerned, He is an
administrative catch 22 situation where he cannot force them to
assume care of his present complaint and while it is possibly
associated in quality relation, it is a new episode." (Ex. D-l, p.
41.) Ashcroft testified that he was using a 3/4 length shovel and
bent over and felt back pain. He then had difficulty straightening
up.
Following Dr. Capel's treatment, the applicant was examined by
Dr. D.R. McNaught on May 8, 1991. Dr. McNaught concluded that
Ashcroft did have severe sciatica, due to the bulging of lumbar
discs L4,5 and possibly LS. He recommended that the applicant
investigate surgery, although Dr. McNaught expressed some
reservations about that approach.
In fact, the applicant was not able to pursue surgical
intervention on his back, due at least partially to the fact that
he has Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. (Ex. D-l, p. 61-62.)
The medical records indicate that Ashcroft tested positive for the
HIV virus in the 1980s, and this condition has since developed into
AIDS. (Ex. D-l, p. 10-17.) Dr. Hagen has treated the applicant
for AIDS since 1989. He stated in a letter dated May 14, 1992,
that the applicant's AIDS condition does not prevent him from
conducting his normal activities, (Ex. A-l). Hagan's records also
indicate that he treated Ashcroft for a variety of conditions, and
that Ashcroft was taking Prozac for depression.
Dr. McNaught referred the applicant to Dr. John Sanders for
consideration of his back condition. Dr. Sanders produced several
reports, including one dated August 9, 1991, which concluded that
surgical intervention was not warranted at that time, with no
reference to the AIDS factors.
Dr. Sanders also wrote a one
paragraph report dated October 7, 1991 stating: ". . .It is my
opinion that because he is unable to return to his usual work that
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he should have been given a disability rating of fifteen percent on
that basis alone,H (Ex. D-l, p. 66.)
Dr. Boyd Holbrook performed a file review on the applicant's
case on April 10, 1992, and found that the majority of his problems
were not industrial in nature. Dr. Holbrook stated in part, H . .
. This man does have significant multi-level cervical disc disease
that is not related to his industrial injury and is not being
considered for any possible surgical treatment and appears to be a
relatively minor portion of his symptom complex.11 Dr. Holbrook
opined that no further medical treatment was needed in connection
with Ashcroft's 1989 injury, that, w . . .it does not appear that
more medical examinations or more diagnostic studies will assist in
the delineation or management of his problem," and that Chymopapain
injections are not advisable, (Ex. D-l, p. 67).
Ashcroft also sought chiropractic care from Dr. Wageman in St.
George. Those chiropractic records show the applicant received
treatments from September 27, 1991, through December, 1991 for 35
visits. Dr. Wageman believed that Ashcroft suffered, ". . .an
exacerbation of his post-traumatic injuries sustained in the
original accident,H of 1989 (Ex. A-l).
The applicant's medical records indicate that he has undergone
the following diagnostic procedures since his industrial injury: xrays (10/89), CT scan (10/89), myelogram-CT scan (12/89), MRI
(2/90), CT scan (5/91), x-rays (10/91), MRI (10/91).
The applicant currently experiences aches in his back and
legs. He takes AZT, wellbutrin and dalmane, as well as headache
medicines.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The applicant in this matter, Denis Ashcroft, unfortunately
has failed to sustain his burden of proof that further temporary
total disability benefits or medical expense benefits are causally
related to his industrial accident of 1989. In fact, according to
medical specialists, the true cause of the applicant's continuing
problems stem from pre-existing degenerative problems, intervening
non-industrial events, and unrelated health conditions. Therefore,
his claim fails for lack of medical and legal causation.
At the time of the hearing, there was no evidence that
Ashcroft was unable to work during the period of his additional
temporary total disability claim. The applicant testified that he
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applied for unemployment, applied for a job as a cook, and in fact,
attended school full-time. He also worked in his father's grocery
store for a time. Two doctors had released him to work (Dr. Bliss,
2/2/90) (Dr. Capel, 6/5/90) and considered him medically stable.
No other medical provider has taken him off work. Utah workers
compensation law is specific on this issue, lf. . . Once a claimant
reaches medical stabilization, the claimant is moved from temporary
to permanent status and he is no longer eligible for temporary
benefits.11 Booms v. Rapp Construction, 720 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah
1986.) Lack of stabilization is the plaintiff's burden to prove,
Griffith v. Industrial Commission. 754 P.2d 981 (Ct. of App. Utah
1988) .
Applicant's counsel argues that Ashcroft is entitled to
further benefits while he is still in the "diagnostic" stage of his
treatment for his back injury. Unfortunately, the medical records
clearly indicate that this case has long ago exhausted the
diagnostic stage. In fact, the applicant has been seen by at least
six specialists, and has had every possible diagnostic test
performed at least twice for his back pain symptoms. The case is
also tragically complicated by the presence of the applicant's AIDS
condition, which may not have become a ". . .severe medical
problem," but ultimately is life-threatening and therefore bound to
influence the applicant's choices with regard to surgery,
employment, as well as any optional medical treatment.
Further, the medical records in this file indicate that the
applicant's case involves psychological components. Moreover, when
carefully reviewed, it is illogical for one to attempt to pin all
the troublesome circumstances of a situation on a single incident
of lumbar strain several years ago, particularly when that
condition stabilized within months and was one which the doctors
refused to surgically treat.
Applicant's counsel further argues that the applicant may fall
into the rare category of one who suffers a sacroiliac condition
that is difficult to diagnose. There is no indication, however, of
that suspicion on behalf of Ashcroft's numerous physicians. Such
arguments are speculative and general, and cannot be the basis of
extending workers compensation benefits indefinitely to the
applicant.
The Administrative Law Judge agrees with Ashcroft's physicians
who have identified this case as a complex one, involving preexisting and psychological factors. In addition, the applicant
experienced two subsequent non-industrial events which occurred
when his doctor said he was doing well. The improvement he was
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making, together with the strenuous nature of the incidents
themselves, render those subsequent events intervening and causally
contributing to his continuing back problems.
As to the permanent partial impairment rating, the applicant
was paid compensation on a 5% whole person permanent partial
disability rating by the defendants. The Administrative Law Judge
does not find a specific rating in the records: Dr. Capel merely
recites what the insurance adjustor was offering and postpones a
rating; Dr. Sanders makes a conclusory statement of 15% without
reference to any underlying facts or industrial cause. Without a
well-supported rating in the record, and the Administrative Law
Judge can only note that a 5% impairment is reasonable for an
unoperated disc problem according to the AMA Guides To the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Table 53.
ORDER:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
Ashcroft, for additional temporary
expenses compensation in connection
September 25, 1989, should be and
legal and medical causation.

claim of the applicant, Denis
total disability and medical
with his industrial injury of
is hereby denied for lack of

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not
subject to review or appeal.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the "-, /''- day of June, 1992, the
attached FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and ORDER in the case
of Denis Ashcroft was mailed, postage pre-paid to the following
persons at the following addresses:
Denis Ashcroft
330 S Main
St. George UT 84770
Bruce Wilson, Atty
290 E 400 N
Provo UT 84604
Liberty Mutual Insurance
PO Box 45440
Salt Lake City UT 84145-0440
Michael Dyer, Atty
PO Box 2465
Salt Lake City UT 84110-2465
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June A. Stoddard, Paralegal. '•>
Adjudication Division
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600
Denis Ashcroft,

*
•

vs.

*
*

DENIAL OF MOTION
FOR REVIEW

Airfax Express, and/or
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,

*
*

Case No. 91000984

Applicant,

*

Respondents.

*

•••••a***************************

The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for
Review of applicant in the above captioned matter, pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12.
The applicant's claim asks for additional compensation and
payments in connection with medical expenses, temporary total
compensation (TTC), permanent partial compensation (PPC), travel
expenses, interest, and medical treatment as a result of his back
injury on September 25, 1989. The administrative law judge (ALJ)
concluded that the applicant had failed to show legal and medical
causation, and therefore denied his claim. It is from this denial
that the applicant appeals based on allegations of the following
errors:
1.
Rejection by the ALJ of two permanent partial
disability ratings in favor of a two year old rating done by the
"Liberty Mutual account manager."
2. The failure of the ALJ to order that a medical panel
be convened to consider among other items the question of maximum
medical improvement.
3. The ALJ did not consider that the treating doctors
were in the diagnostic stages of the case, and the doctors had not
decided upon a course of treatment.
4. The ALJ lost or ignored the chiropractor's results
that the applicant was improving with chiropractic treatment.
5. This case contains objective evidence of several
radiographically verified disc injuries, and surgery was a "clear
possibility but for the complication of the AIDS."
The respondents argue in rebuttal that the medical evidence
did not give rise to the need for a medical panel review, and that
there is no conflict in the medical evidence regarding the
applicant's attainment of maximum medical improvement. We will
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briefly discuss the pertinent
allegations of error.

facts

as

they

relate

to

the

There seems to be no dispute about the basic facts of the
original industrial injury, in 1989. At that time, the applicant
was a driver for Airfax Express. On September 25, 1989, he was
using a dolly to unload boxes at a K-Mart. He bent over, and could
not thereafter stand straight. Experiencing pain in his back, he
crawled to the edge of his truck, and called his employer. His
employer told him to finish unloading.1 He apparently was able to
have the K-Mart employees complete the task, and he subsequently
drove to another K-Mart where he was again able to have its
employees do the same. The applicant then drove to Ogden, parked
his truck, and used a taxi to get to a hospital emergency room.
The emergency room treatment and procedures consisted of xrays, muscle relaxants, and pain medication. After a trip back to
St. George by bus, the applicant was treated by his family doctor,
Dr. McGregor, on September 28, 1989. After a period of bed rest,
the applicant was seen by the doctor during the following two
months. Dr. McGregor diagnosed the applicant as having bulging
disc/spinal stenosis. The doctor referred the applicant to Dr.
Bliss, a neurosurgeon.
Dr. Bliss saw the applicant on a number of occasions during
the period October 20, 1989 through February 20, 1990. The doctor
recommended that the applicant receive conservative treatment, and
stated that "...Patient clearly interprets all of his problems as
stemming from his recent accident although multiple level disc
disease indicates that he has had pre-existing problems and in
addition, back pain is not his major complaint at this time."
Exhibit D-l, at 24. Further, the doctor concluded on February 2,
1990 that the applicant was w...medically stable for return to
limited employment in nonlaboring activity.11 I£., at 26.
During the period April 12, 1990 through March 15, 1991, the
applicant was treated by Dr. Capel. Dr. Capel placed the applicant
on a work hardening and conditioning program. On May 10, 1990, the
applicant experienced intrascapular pain, and went to an emergency
room for treatment.
The doctor explained this episode as an
anxiety reaction with somatization, and recommended general
conditioning, bicycle riding, and swimming. On June 5, 1990, the
applicant was given a work release, and apparently told the doctor
that he had an imminent job as a cook. Apparently, the applicant
did not return to work, but instead attended Dixie College as a
student.
Between July 12, 1990, and March 15, 1991, the applicant
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experienced muscle aches, back and leg pain, and anxiety symptoms
on various occasions. Low back pain appeared after the applicant
lifted two or three pieces of firewood, and a second episode
occurred when the applicant attempted to clean up some of his dog's
excrement. Dr. Capel noted on November 13, 1990 that the applicant
had discontinued some of his conditioning exercises.
It appears that surgery is either not warranted for the
applicant's medical problems, or is not recommended due to AIDS
which has developed in the applicant from his initial contact with
the HIV in the 1980's. Although one doctor recommended that the
applicant investigate surgery (Dr. McNaught), another (Dr. Hunter)
indicated that some surgery may be possible, two other doctors have
indicated that surgery is not warranted (Dr. Holbrook and Dr.
Sanders) . Dr. Holbrook reviewed the applicant's file and concluded
that the majority of the applicant's problems were not industrial
in nature.
The doctor concluded that additional medical
examinations or diagnostic studies will not assist in the
"delineation or management of [the applicant's] problem [in
connection with the 1989 injury....M Exhibit D-l at 67.
Contrary to the view of Dr. Holbrook, and others, is that of
a treating chiropractic physician, Dr. Wageman, who believed that
the applicant suffered "...an exacerbation of his post-traumatic
injuries sustained in the original accident..." of 1989. Exhibit
A-l. We have concluded that the specialists who determined that
the applicant's problems were not industrial in nature outweigh the
opinion of Dr. Wageman.
The ALJ concluded that the applicant had failed to sustain his
burden of proof that he was further entitled to TTC or to medical
expense benefits. There is substantial evidence in the file in
light of the entire record to show that the applicant's continuing
problems result from conditions unrelated to the industrial
accident. Thus, the applicant has failed to show medical and legal
causation.
Under these circumstances, no medical panel is
necessary.
The file shows that two doctors considered the applicant to be
medically stable during the period that the applicant claims
additional TTC. As a result, they had released the applicant to
work. It is clear that when an injured worker is released from
temporary total disability status that TTC should no longer be
received. Booms v. Rapp Construction. 720 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah
1986).
The applicant's argument that he was still within the
diagnostic stages of treatment is contrary to the evidence. Six
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specialists have reviewed his case over time, and the applicant has
had numerous diagnostic tests completed. None of the specialists
with the possible exception of Dr. Hunter have concluded that
surgery is warranted or possible.
Dr. Holbrook, for example,
concluded that no further examinations or diagnostic tests were
warranted. This statement shows that the diagnostic period was
complete.
This case is complicated by the applicant's pre-existing
medical problems, and by his limitation on medical choices forced
upon him by AIDS.
In addition, the applicant suffered two
subsequent nonindustrial accidents which can be considered to be
intervening and causally contributing events to the applicant's
continuing back problems.
In connection with the permanent partial impairment rating,
the applicant argues that he should be given a higher rating since
Dr. Sanders indicated that a 15 percent rating was appropriate
since the applicant could not work. The applicant also cited Dr.
Capel as support for this contention that the rating previously
determined at five percent was too low. We note that the applicant
was paid for his permanent partial impairment compensation. We
agree with the ALJ that a five percent impairment is reasonable for
an unoperated disc problem based upon the Guides to the Evaluation
of Permanent Impairment. Table 53 (3d ed. rev. 1990) published by
the American Medical Association.
The bald statement by Dr. Sanders, in connection with his
assertion that a 15 percent rating was appropriate, was supported
by absolutely no medical analysis or logic.
We need some
justification, and in the absence of such, we cannot speculate. In
the case of Dr. Capel, there is no statement by him as to any
appropriate rating, other than a statement that the adjustor had
decided upon a five percent rating. We therefore conclude that the
evidence does not support the applicant in this regard.
Under the circumstances, we conclude that the ALJ's findings,
conclusions of law, and order were based upon substantial evidence
in light of the entire record, and the legal conclusions were
correct. The applicant has failed to prove his case.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge
dated June 29, 1992 is affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
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Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b16.
The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a
transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes.

Stephen M. Hadley
Chairman

cTWIUMilW

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

Colleen S. Colton
Commissioner
Certified t h i s ^ ^ J ^ a y of (},^J/
ATTEST:
Patricia 0. Ash
Commission Secretary
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Michael Dyer
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Liberty Mutual Insurance
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J O H N M. SANDERS, M. O.
A PROFESSIONAL

CORPORATION

Adult Neyrosur&ry

166 EAST S 9 0 0 SOUTH, SUITE BI04
MURRAY, UTAH B4IQ7

October 7, 1991

To Whom it May Concern:

This is a note regarding my patient, Dennis Ashcroft,
whom I have seen in consultation at the request of Dr.
Ross McNaught. It is my opinion that because he is
unable to return to his usual work that he should have
been given a disability rating of fifteen percent on
that basis alone.
Yours truly,

JOHN M. SANDERS, M.D.
JMS:am
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BOYD G. HOLBROOK. M.D.
ORTHOPAEDIC EVALUATION
1431 PENROSE DRIVE
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH

84103

TELEPHONE (801) 3 5 5 - 0 1 5 4

April 10, 1992

Michael E. Dyer, Attorney
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
Key Bank Tower
50 South Main 7th Floor
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Re:

Denis B. Ashcroft
Ashcroft v. Airfax Express
Claim No.: WC667-037046
Inj: 8/25/89
Your File No.: 8871-244
Dear Mr. Dyer:

At your request I have reviewed this medical file with particular reference to the complex matters that you would like to
resolve as presented in your history and questions contained
in your cover latter.
REVIEW OF FILE:
The employer's first report of injury dated 9-27-89 indicates
that this 40 year old truck driver was injured 9-25-89 unloading freight when he twisted his back.
He last worked the following day and consulted Dr. M. K. McGregor September 28, 1989 with acute low back pain and profound
muscle spasm in all directions and pain radiating down to the
midposterior thigh. It notes "injury to lower back while unloading a trailer".
10-20-89 He was seen by Donald G. Bliss, M.D. who completed a
comprehensive evaluation. MHe was lifting boxes while unloading
a truck on 9-25-89 when he had a sudden severe pain in his back.
The pain was like a "ripping sensation" and he had a hot burning
sensation going up into his neck". The pain was so severe he
went to the emergency room. He has gradually improved with
treatment but suddenly worse six days ago radiating into the
left and then the right leg. He has had some intermittent minor
low back pain on occasion with work in the past. On examination
he found a slight list to the left. Some difficulty arising from
the bent position and SLR 45 degrees. Reflexes, sensation and
motor power normal but not tested in detail. X-rays felt to be
normal. CT scan 10-17-89 shows a symmetrical central bulge at
the L-3-4 disc with some compromise of the spinal canal but no
root impingement. He recommended conservative treatment but noted
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and continued under the care of Dr. Bliss with bilateral leg pain
severely aggravated my myelogram. He had mild persistent paresthesia in his toes. Myelogram and CT show significant disc bulging at three levels but the spinal canal is fairly capacius without specific nerve root involvement.
2-1-90 He was evaluated by Dr. Gerald Moress. His back pain is almost gone and he only notices it now when bends over or does some
lifting. Beginning in October he started having impotence. He
has now noticed some tingling in the upper extremities. He found
no evidence of spinal stenosis and sensory findings in upper and
lower extremities. He believed the pathology was within the cervical cord, either a hard disc or some demyelating disease and
recommended complete myelography and CSF studies.
26 February 1990 MRI of the cervical spine with the following impression:
1.

Multilevel cervical spine disease (narrowing including foraminal narrowing and prominence of the facet joints.

2.

Small herniated discs at C-4-5 and C-6-7 levels.

3.

Mild concentric posterior bulge at C-5-6 level.

4.

Mild to moderate narrowing at the intervertebral foramina
at multiple levels as described.

2-27-90 Dr. Bliss recommended review with Dr. Moress. Patient
clearly interprets all of his problems as stemming from his recent
accident although multiple level disc disease indicates that he
has had pre-existing problems and in addition, back pain is not
his major complaint at this time.
March 22, 1990 he was examined by Neal C. Capel, M.D. who performed a complete study. He has burning discomfort from D-7 - L-2,
midline in both right and left paravertebral and ache in posterior
thighs to the knees and calves with numbness. He further described
his symptoms and x-rays. His diagnosis was acute low back strain
and sprain with dysesthesiasbut no definite root signs with multiple segment disc protrusions most prominently 5-S-l with degenerative disc segments. Psychosocial changes are quite prominent
in the clinical context. He has not moved toward employability
in his mind at all and has a passive approach. Most of the changes
pre-existed the accident date. He should have a vigorous conditioning program followed by a rating of 5% impairment of the whole
person. He is not a candidate for surgical intervention and further treatment measures or evaluation measures would probably best
be applied to psychodynamic study and psychiatric consultation
as he believes these factors are impacting his disability.
He subsequently was on an exercise program and taking architectviral drafting at Dixie College. He continued with moderate sympt,^ 4-v* .^^.i^4-„,. ^^^^+.4^^ ar,^ si-ress buildup. He went to Arizona
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and worked in his father's grocery store. His back did fairly
well, but his legs got tired as he was on his feet all day on
concrete. He is back in school again now.
11-13 He had the flu in the last 2 to 3 weeks and has not been
carrying out his proper rehabilitation program.
11-29-90 New episode. On Sunday last, November 25th the patient
picked firewood with sudden onset of low back pain more on the
right. His diagnosis was facet syndrome and low back strain.
He worked in his parent's grocery store about a month at Christmas time, has difficulty straightening up, has had psychological
counseling and was again noted to have normal objective examination with subjective complaints. He recommended he continue his
exercise program. By 3-15-91 he was getting along reasonably
well until March 14th when he bent down to clean manure from his
dog and sudden pain in the low back and trouble standing up.
Bed rest was recommended.
9-26-91 He was in requesting that Dr. Capel relate the lifting
of firewood episode November 25th to the accident of 9-25-89.
He has been seeing other doctors for MRl and surgical consideration. "I have, of course, made that decision long ago".
MRI 4 October 1991 with the following impression:
1.

Multiple degenerative disc disease with Grade II central
bulge L-2-3, Grade I-XI central bulge L-3-4 and L-4-5, and
Grade I central and slightly to the right central bulge
L-4-S-1.

2.

Borderline to moderate central spinal stenosis L-2-3.

3. Mild facet arthritis multiple levels with mild left foraminal
stenosis L-5-S-1.
Willard S* Hunter, M.D., Phoeniz, Arizona reported October 14, 1991
an absence of his right ankle reflex not previously noted, limitation of straight leg raising at 30 degrees on the right and 50 de-

grees on the left,

decreased

sensation

outer aspect

of the

right

foot and rather severe cervical disc disease which cannot be treated except by an open operative intervention. Because of the recent
change he recommended Chymofast test. I think he now has a herniated disc at L-5-S-1. I advised that he could be injected.
Dr. Hunter later noted that the decision regarding surgical intervention is affected by his HIV status. Also, would mean more
caution for hospital personnel.
May 8, 1991 office consultation by D. R. McNaught is out of chronological order here. He again performed a complete evaluation. He
is tired of living with the complaints and being unable to sleep
at night although severe pain does not appear to be his major problem. The left calf is 1 cm smaller than the right. There is tend-
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erness. Reflexes normal. Slight weakness dorsiflecion both great
toes. Reduced sensation bilaterally L-5 and in the calf and lateral border of feet which is quite numb, extending into the fifth
toes of both feet. He reviewed the x-rays. He felt he did not
have severe sciatica but ongoing complaints presumably due to at
least significant bulging of lumbar discs primarily L-4,5 and perhaps some at the L-S level. It is doubtful he is a surgical candidate but does not want to go on living with his present complaints.
He suggested possible epidural steroid injections if a new MRI is
normal. He also suggested the possibility of Chymopapain injection.
August 9, 1991 he was seen in consultation by John M. Sanders, M.D.
who noted at the beginning his history seems to be fairly straight
forward dating back to 1989 when he was unloading a truck and further reviewed the history. Nothing has given him any sustained relief. He has nothing to gain financially from having a surgical
procedure done. I would have given the patient a 15% disability
rating on the basis of his inability to return to his usual work.
I think he got a 5% disability rating. (This clearly demonstrates
a wide spread problem - the lack of understanding of rating of permanent physical impairment in industrial cases.)
He performed straight leg raising reasonably well. Reflexes were
normal. Some sensory difference on alternate sides with difficulty
knowing how to evaluate that. No atrophy. Motor power apparently
normal. He reviewed his films and does not see a surgical lesion.
In the lumbar region he has considerable fullness of the disc at
L-3-4, 4-5 and L-5-S-1 but the nerve outlets seem to be satisfactory. He was still concerned they may be missing some neurological
problem and he may see another neurologist or return to Dr. Moress.
He did note a possibility of Chymopapain injection and/or aspiration of the disc spaces because he doesn't have a focal lump of disc
that would be missed by those procedures. "Those are procedures
that I have not been pleased with as I have seem them from this
point in time but some people have done them and in their hands
have reported good results so I' 11 leave that evaluation to you and
someone else who sees him that might do those procedures)
October 23, 1991 Dr. Sanders further reported that MRI didn't
really show what he considered to be a specific surgical lesion
though there are clearly some problems at multiple levels. None
of them seem significant to warrant surgical intervention at the
present time.
SPECIAL STUDIES:
9-28-89 X-rays of the lumbar spine were interpreted by Dr. McGregor
as normal.
10-17-89 CT lumbar spine Dixie Medical Center disc bulging at three
levels with some decrease in AP diameter at L-3-4. The bulge at
this level is in a symmetrical fashion. At L-4-5 there is some
posterior symmetrical bulge and at L-5-S-1 some symmetrical bulge
^

1-5 4-4-1^ w/M^a

nrftmi na«4-

4-Vnan

af

4-Vio

ahnvo

l o v o U

HlTf- n n

mmDromise

Page five
Re:

Denis B. Ashcroft

of the thecal sac or nerve roots. There does appear to be a degenerative disc with vacuum phenomena at L-5-S-1. The above findings
are somewhat equivocal.
12-19-89 Lumbar myelogram with CT scan Dixie Medical Center. Bulging discs at multiple levels with slight nerve root asymmetry at
L-5-S-1 on the myelogram. With CT there was noted to be bulging
at L-2-3. At L-3-4 there was mild impression of the anterior aspect
of the thecal sac but no focal protrusion to suggest herniation
and no encroachment of nerve roots. At L-4-5 there was disc degeneration vacuum phenomenon with no impingement. At L-5-S-1 there
is disc space narrowing and degeneration and vacuum phenomenon.
With the bulging there is slight asymmetry to the right which encroaches on the right first sacral root slightly. This should be
correlated with clinical symptoms but is suggestive of focal herniation at L-5-S-1 and could account for a right S-l radiculopathy.
2-26-90 MRI of the cervical spine performed at Utah Valley Hospital
showed significant findings but does not require further consideration at this time.
5-7-91 Lumbar spine CT Valley View Medical Center showed degenerative disc disease at L-5-S-1 with narrowing the disc space and gas
in the disc. The posterior disc margin has a smooth, mild posterior bulge, without herniation.
Posterior disc bulging is demonstrated at L-3-4 and 4-5 but this
appears to be on a degenerative basis without actual herniation.
10-2-91 X-rays lumbar spine Utah Valley Hospital demonstrate mild
changes at L-4-5 and L-5-S-1.
10-4-91 MRI lumbar spine Cottonwood Hospital shows multi-level disc
disease with bulging at the four lower levels.
L-2-3 disc is desiccated with central bulging, flattening of the
thecal sac and moderate spinal stenosis.
L-3-4 focal central bulging with desiccated disc and minimal flattening of the thecal sac.
L-4-5 disc is desiccated with focal central bulging.
L-5-S-1 disc is desiccated with focal grade I - II central disc
bulge slightly asymmetric to the right without extruded fragment
or nerve root comprssion. There is no significant compression of
the thecal sac. Minimal foraminal stenosis is present slightly
greater on the left but no definite nerve root impingement is
apparent.
Degenerative changes were noted at all levels.
22 January 1992 lumbar discography assessment:
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Internally disrupted discs with sizable posterior protrusions
from L-3 through S-l. The L-4-5 and L-5-S-1 levels appear to
be the most significant. Never the less, typical reproduction of the patientfs usual leg pain was not achieved. The
patient did have his typical back pain which, by his own
admission, is his least pain with injection at the L-4-5
level.

DISCUSSION:
There are those individuals who seek interminably more and more
medical care as a solution to their problem. Medicine cannot solve
all problems. Doctors cannot solve all problems. Surgery cannot
solve all problems.
This man does have significant multi-level cervical disc disease
that is not related to his industrial injury and is not being considered for any possible surgical treatment and appears to be a
relatively minor portion of his symptom complex.
Major problem hinges on the lumbar area.
In your letter you suggest that the L-3-4 disc was the one that
was being considered for treatment but ray review of this case indicates that the L-5-S-1 is the disc being singled out for treatment.
There is no question but what multiple studies have been performed
which in general all agree with each other. There have been no
specific new revelations by any succeeding tests and these have
been done because the patient has seen more and more doctors who
felt more and more tests should be required. If one continues to
see an unending string of doctors almost an unending therapy program will be prescribed and tests will be repeated over and over
to ensure that something has not been missed. Once a person has
seen two competent physicians it is almost never that any significant
pathology that is different is going to be uncovered by a third.
Thus repeated medical evaluations becomes a goal in itself in a
desperate search by the patient who is unable to say enough is
enough and to accept the diagnosis, the prognosis, and more particularly accept his role as the patient. It appears that this
person has been unwilling to do this but he is looking for some
doctor to solve his problem. One hears of these rare and magical
cases that are reported and continue to give all persons hope,
but this is not realistic. This man has had every benefit of
medical care and evaluation having been seen and evaluated and in
some instances treated by five specialists prior to seeing Dr.
Hunter.
Dr. Hunter has extensive experience in Chymopapain injections and
was, in fact, personally one of the very early persons to receive
this treatment and was gratified by the results. In general,
after extensive publicity the procedure has receded to where it
is now seldom performed. Newer procedures such as percutaneous
discectomy and suction discectomy have come along and they are being tried as well. Anything that is new is good and everybody
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wants the new thing whether it is proven to be as good or better
than the old thing or not.
Dr. Hunter is the only one of these five previous physicians who
has really had any kind of feeling that surgical treatment could
actually be recommended though Dr. McNaught and Dr. Sanders did
mention it as a possible consideration. I suspect that this was
primarily prompted by the encouragement or insistence of the patienlfc. I may not be properly characterizing their opinion regarding Chemonucleolysis in this patient. Thus, I don't know if his
referral to Dr. Hunter was really initiated by his attending physician's here or was more or less requested or demanded by the patient.
Dr. Hunter is the only one who found any reflex changes and he
is the only one who has felt that there was any real surgical
conclusion to be drawn from the sensory pattern that this man
demonstrates. If one goes all the way back to the time he was
under the care of Dr. Capel and reads the last few notes of Dr.
Capel it still very clearly states this man's status and I don't
believe that all of the other evaluations and studies have changed that.
It is difficult to delineate the level of his pain but I would
surmise that his fears regarding his physical condition have overwhelmed him. That he may not be dealing well with his HIV status
and that he may well be transferring his health care concerns to
something that he can specifically identify in his back and hope
that some magic is going to significantly improve his condition.
I am not sure how strongly Dr. Hunter feels about this surgical
condition and how strongly he is urging this because he states
"I think he now has a herniated disc at L-5-S-1 and advised that
he could be injected" (emphasis added). This gives this reviewer
more of an impression that Dr. Hunter would be acquiescing in the
wishes and desires of the patient more than he is actively promoting this procedure himself.
There are two additional factors in this case. 11-25-90 the patient had a significant new episode. Prior to this it would appear
that he was getting along quite well and was definitely substantially worse following that episode.
3-15-91 It was noted he was getting along reasonably well until
March 14, 1991 when he bent down to clean manure and had sudden
pain in the low back and trouble standing up representing another
further significant episode though not really associated with
undue stress or strain. Thus, there are two significant episodes
thathave continued to contribute to his problem subsequent to the
industrial accident though there was not shown to be any substantial change in the specific diagnostic studies from the time before
until the time after these two episodes.
One should additionally note the lack of specificity of the disco-
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gram as to the delineating the level of the problem to which
treatment should be directed.
ANSWERS TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS:
1. No further additional, medical treatment is reasonable and necessary for Mr. Ashcroft as a direct result of the industrial event
of September 25, 19 89.
2. The proposed Chymopapain injection is not a reasonably necessary medical treatment in light of Mr. Ashcroft1s overall medical
condition and more specifically in regards to these two specific
factors:
a.

There is diffuse degenerative disc disease involving
four levels of his lumbar spine.

b.

Even the worst reading relative to the L-5-S-1 disc
interprets this as a rather benign protrusion or disc
herniated that could not reasonably be expected to
compress the nerve roots on both sides. This would not
explain apparent weak dorsiflexion of the toes and subjective paresthesia and would not appear to be sufficient
to recommend or urge surgery. Dr. Hunter has based his
conclusions regarding surgery a good deal on the absence
of his right ankle reflex which appears to be a change
since his last prior examination by Dr. Sanders associated with limitation of straight leg raising and decrease
sensation on the outer aspect of the right foot.

In view of the extensive studies and evaluations that this patient
has had it does not appear that more medical examinations or more
diagnostic studies will assist in the delineation or management
of his problem. If one felt compelled to obtain additional evaluation to help clear the air then perhaps a re-evaluation by Dr. Moress who saw him some time ago and could review all of his subsequent
radiographic studies if he felt it would be helpful in additon to
the reports.
3. If Mr. Ashcroft undergoes the Chymopapain injection in any
event this is generally considered to be a rather benign operative
procedure with a low complication rate and a rather low morbidity
rate but sometimes temporary total disability will continue beyond
three months and sometimes associated with rather severe muscle
spasm and extended aggravation of symptoms. Frequently there is
no improvement. The additional problem is that a multi-level disc
disease and the inability to be certain that one is attacking an
area that is the primary cause of his pain in view of all of the
studies including the discography. Even "good" relief at this
level may constitute very little improvement in the total picture.
Under no circumstances would a fusion be considered in view of his
other medical conditions as well as the extensive nature of his
lumbar spine disease.
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There is increased surgical risks with Aids but a simple Chymopapain
injection would appear to carry minimal additional risks.
4. Most of those who have examined this applicant have felt that
his neurological symptoms are primarily not related to a protruded
or herniated intervertebral- disc and thus not specifically related
to the alleged injury of 9-25-89.
If I can be of any further assistance in this complex matter please
contact me further.
Very si|raerely,

Boyd G. Holbrook, M.D.
BGH:hh
enclosure
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Bruce J. Wilson (3504)
290 East 4000 North
Provo, Utah 84604
(801) 226-0564

IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
*

Denis Ashcroft
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Applicant,
vs
Airfax Express Inc.
Defendant,

APPLICANT, Denis Ashcroft
hereby requests this matter
following basis:

Motion for Review or
Reconsideration

through his
be reviewed

counsel, Bruce Wilson,
and reversed for the

1.
There were two doctors giving a rating of 10% by Dr.
McNaught, (See exhibit 1) and 15% by Dr. Sanders, (See exhibit 2)
and the ALJ rejected them in favor of a two year old 5% rating
done by the "Liberty Mutual account manager" (See Exhibit 3)
based on lack of credibility of the Dr. Sanders.
2.

Rule R490-1-9(A)(l)(a) Says:
"A panel
where:

will be

utilized by

the Administrative Law Judge

1. One or more significant medical issues may be
involved.
Generally a significant medical issue must
be shown by conflicting medical reports.
Significant
medical issues are involved when there are:
a.
Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical
impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole
person,ff
(Emphasis added)
It

is

contrary

to

justice

to make a credibility finding

against a medical opinion of a doctor who is not allowed to be
present to testify. Rule R490-1-9 makes medical panels mandatory
for resolving medical disputes for that very reason.
3. The ALJ also did not take into account the fact that the
treating doctors were still actively considering alternative
procedures, including chymopapain and various surgeries.
She
either lost or ignored the chiropractor's results that he was
improving with chiropractic treatment (exhibit 4 ) .
The question
of Maximum Medical Improvement should also be considered by a
panel.
4. This is not a case of no objective evidence.
There are
several radiographically verified discs injuries. Surgery was a
clear possibility but for the complication of the AIDS.
This is
not a chronic pain without objective evidence case and should not
be treated as such.
WHEREFORE, Applicant requests the ALJ f s findings be reversed
and the matter be sent to a medical panel, as the ALJ indicated
at the hearing she intended to do.
Respectfully^ submitted,

Bruce Wilson

